No. 09-594

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

JOSE ERASMO DE LA ROSA,
Petitioner,
v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

SETH P. WAXMAN
PAUL R.Q. WOLFSON
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE AND DORR LLP
1875 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 663-6000

MARIA I. CASABLANCA
CASABLANCA LEGAL GROUP
444 Brickell Ave., Suite 416
Miami, FL 33131
(305) 577-4220

MARK C. FLEMING
Counsel of Record
MEGAN BARBERO
ELIZABETH KENT CULLEN
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE AND DORR LLP
60 State Street
Boston, MA 02109
(617) 526-6000
mark.fleming@wilmerhale.com

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The government does not dispute that the question presented has split the circuits, has been fully aired, and is critically significant to hundreds of lawful permanent residents (LPRs). It instead contends primarily that the decision below was correct. Opp. 8. That is wrong, but in any event is not a reason to deny review given the irreconcilable circuit split on an important and recurring question of federal law.

ARGUMENT

1. Petitioner indisputably would have been eligible for Section 212(c) relief had his case originated in the Second Circuit. The government disparages that

court as an "outlier" (Opp. 17)—a term hardly befitting the circuit that hears over one-quarter of all immigration cases and more than the *combined* total of cases from circuits agreeing with the government's position. Pet. 20 n.13. And the government does not defend the extreme reasoning of the Ninth Circuit, contending instead (Opp. 9) that the Ninth Circuit's position "essentially comports" with that of other circuits—a revisionist interpretation rejected by the courts involved. *E.g.*, Pet. App. 22a n.14 (Eleventh Circuit's refusal to follow "the route taken by the Ninth Circuit"); *Abebe* v. *Mukasey*, 554 F.3d 1203, 1211 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (Clifton, J., concurring) (Ninth Circuit majority "create[d] a three-way circuit split"), *petition for cert. filed sub nom. Abebe* v. *Holder*, 78 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Nov. 16, 2009) (No. 09-600). Ultimately, it does not matter whether the circuits are split two ways or three; what matters is that cases are decided differently depending on their venue.[1]

The government does not dispute that the question presented has arisen in over 120 circuit and BIA cases since 2005 (Pet. App. 45a-52a)—a figure that does not include unreported decisions of immigration judges. Nor does a decline in Section 212(c) grants between 2004 and 2009 (Opp. 18) help the government, because that decline coincides with the BIA's 2005 decision in *Matter of Blake*, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722, *rev'd*, 489 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007). It is hardly surprising that Section

[1] Some LPRs are moved from the Second Circuit to detention in other circuits, which can doom meritorious Section 212(c) claims. *E.g.*, *Matter of Ramcharran*, 2008 WL 4420107 (BIA Sept. 23, 2008) (Section 212(c) claim denied after LPR living in New York was transferred to detention in Texas).

212(c) grants dropped immediately after the BIA's unexpected "change in law," which eliminated Section 212(c) relief for hundreds of LPRs who previously were eligible for it. *Matter of Cardona*, 2005 WL 3709244 (BIA Dec. 27, 2005), *appeal docketed*, No. 08-70736 (9th Cir. Feb. 22, 2008); Pet. 11-15 & nn.6-7.

The government's claim that Section 212(c) *applications* have decreased since 2004—a claim supposedly based on unidentified "published and unpublished statistics" (Opp. 18 & n.7)—is similarly unavailing. LPRs in circuits governed by *Blake* are less likely to apply for Section 212(c) relief or to be informed by counsel or an immigration judge that they may do so. Moreover, because the government has not revealed the methodology underlying its "unpublished statistics," it is unclear whether they include cases in which the government moves to "pretermit" Section 212(c) relief. *E.g.*, Pet. App. 3a. And even the government admits that 858 LPRs were granted Section 212(c) relief in 2009. Opp. 18. A form of relief that allows over 800 people to avoid removal each year is far from unimportant.

Nor does Section 212(c)'s prospective repeal in 1996 reduce its importance as a present-day avenue for relief. For many LPRs who have lived here lawfully for decades, the issue only arises when they apply for naturalization, as Petitioner did, and the government then tries to deport them. *E.g.*, *Lovan* v. *Holder*, 574 F.3d 990, 992 (8th Cir. 2009). Section 212(c) thus still affects hundreds if not thousands of people—far more than those likely affected by the statute at issue in *Flores-Villar* v. *United States*, 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008), *cert. granted*, 78 U.S.L.W. 3546 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2010) (No. 09-5801), which involves a provision amended in 1986 in a way that substantially reduced its scope. Cert. Opp. 17, *Flores-Villar*.

The government observes that this Court denied two similar petitions last year. But as the government pointed out at the time, the circuits had not fully aired the issue. Cert. Opp. 9, *Gonzalez-Mesias* v. *Holder*, No. 08-605 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2009) (issue had not "fully percolated" (quotation marks omitted)); Cert. Opp. 13, *Birkett* v. *Holder*, No. 08-6816 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2009) (review would be "premature"). The government makes no such argument now. Moreover, the prior petitions did not identify the BIA's consistent practice of *granting* Section 212(c) relief to deportable LPRs in Petitioner's position or the frequency with which this issue arises. Pet. 11-12; Pet. App. 45a-52a.

The BIA has essentially undone this Court's decision in *INS* v. *St. Cyr*, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), repealing Section 212(c) for any LPR outside the Second Circuit who is deportable for a non-drug aggravated felony—unless the LPR fortuitously left the United States and returned. That erroneous constriction of Section 212(c) implicates undeniably powerful interests: deportation "may result … in loss of both property and life, or of all that makes life worth living." *Ng Fung Ho* v. *White*, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922); *see also Padilla* v. *Kentucky*, 2010 WL 1222274, at *11 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2010) (describing "[t]he severity of deportation" as "the equivalent of banishment or exile" (quotation marks omitted)). Petitioner, whom an immigration judge found was "rehabilitated" (Pet. App. 39a), has been separated from his work, his property, and his U.S. citizen children and other family members since October 2008. These circumstances warrant this Court's review.

2. The government's merits arguments depend on distorting both Section 212(c)'s history and Petitioner's position.

a. The government argues that the BIA's sudden about-face in 2005 was not retroactive. Opp. 16 n.5; *accord* Opp. 11. Yet the government identifies no pre-2005 case—not one—holding that an LPR who was deportable for a "crime of violence" or "sexual abuse of a minor" offense was ineligible for Section 212(c) relief. Petitioner, by contrast, identified several contrary examples, including cases in which relief was granted but then withdrawn after *Blake* changed the law. Pet. 11-12 nn.6-7, 15.

The government cavils that BIA decisions granting relief were not "precedential" (Opp. 11-12), without explaining why that should matter. Consistent uniform decisions, published or not, indicate agency practice. *See Cruz* v. *Attorney General*, 452 F.3d 240, 246 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting "routine[]" BIA practice based on "ten unpublished opinions" with no contrary decision). If anything, non-publication suggests that the decisions were uncontroversial and did not involve the "alteration, modification, or clarification of an existing rule of law." BIA Practice Manual § 1.4(d)(i)(A). The "unbroken string of unpublished opinions" also "underline[s] the correctness" of similar reasoning in published decisions. *Perez-Enriquez* v. *Gonzales*, 463 F.3d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).[2]

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[2] In 1992, the BIA held that an LPR convicted of attempted murder (a crime of violence) could apply for Section 212(c) relief, distinguishing firearms cases in which the LPR lacked "a comparable ground of excludability." *Matter of Rodriguez-Cortes*, 20 I. & N. Dec. 587, 589-590. The BIA's remand "to afford the [LPR] an opportunity to apply for a [Section 212(c)] waiver" (*id.* at 591) would have been futile if all crimes of violence lacked statutory counterparts. That same year, the BIA found that an LPR convicted of murder was "deportable under a deportation provision

The BIA's approach before 2005 mirrors contemporaneous court of appeals decisions, none of which the government addresses. Pet. 10, 12-13. Even the government itself, when opposing Section 212(c) relief for an LPR convicted of a crime of violence, did not argue that relief was unavailable due to lack of a statutory counterpart. Appellees' Br. 11-12, *Cordes* v. *Gonzales*, No. 04-15988 (9th Cir. Oct. 12, 2004). Such an argument, were it correct, would have easily resolved the case in the government's favor; instead, the LPR prevailed. *Cordes* v. *Gonzales*, 421 F.3d 889, 893, 898-899 (9th Cir. 2005), *vacated on other grounds sub nom. Cordes* v. *Mukasey*, 517 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2008). And the government argued in 2002 that "Congress could rationally have decided to eliminate [Section 212(c)] relief altogether for all aliens convicted of … crimes of violence"—a contention that only made sense because LPRs with "crime of violence" convictions *were* eligible for relief. Appellee's Br. *13, *United States* v. *Ubaldo-Figueroa*, 2002 WL 32254035 (9th Cir. Oct. 10, 2002). The government's advocacy was not inadvertent; it reflected the universal understanding before 2005 that "crime of violence" and "sexual abuse of a minor" offenses were waivable under Section 212(c). *See also* Pet. App. 43a (government counsel conceding in February 2005 that Mr. De la Rosa "appears eligible" for relief).

Given this uniform practice, the government's suggestion that Petitioner could "have easily avoided" removal "by departing the country voluntarily at any

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analogous to the exclusion ground at section 212(a)(9)," *i.e.*, crime involving moral turpitude. *Matter of A-A-*, 20 I. & N. Dec. 492, 500-501.

point before his removal proceedings were initiated in 2004" is unfathomable. Opp. 18. In 2004, no immigration lawyer, judge, or even government lawyer would have told Petitioner that his eligibility for Section 212(c) relief depended on departing the country. The BIA and every circuit had agreed that deportable aliens need *not* depart, and the Solicitor General acquiesced in that reading of Section 212(c). Pet. 8 & n.3. The government's suggestion that Petitioner should have anticipated in 2004 that the BIA would reverse course in 2005 is untenable.[3]

The government's assertion that the statutory counterpart test is "not new" (Opp. 17) is similarly misdirected. Before 2005, the BIA consistently held that LPRs like Petitioner *satisfied* the test because their offenses had a statutory counterpart, namely "crime involving moral turpitude" (CIMT). The two deportation bases that categorically failed the test were "entry without inspection and firearms violations." Aleinikoff, Martin, & Motomura, *Immigration: Process & Policy* 703-704 (3d ed. 1995); *see also Matter of Hernandez-Casillas*, 20 I. & N. Dec. 262, 282 n.4 (Att'y Gen. 1991).

The government weakly claims (Opp. 4) that "the analytical underpinnings of its interpretation" were found in *Komarenko* v. *INS*, 35 F.3d 432 (9th Cir. 1994), *abrogated by Abebe*, 554 F.3d 1203. The BIA did not think so; it treated LPRs deportable for "crime of violence" and "sexual abuse" offenses as eligible for Section 212(c) relief well after *Komarenko*, including in

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[3] Equally untenable is the suggestion that Petitioner's presence was "'illegal.'" Opp. 18 (quoting *Fernandez-Vargas* v. *Gonzales*, 548 U.S. 30, 44 (2006)). Petitioner entered as and remained a lawful permanent resident. Pet. App. 38a.

cases arising in the Ninth Circuit. *See Matter of Orrosquieta*, 2003 WL 23508672 (BIA Dec. 19, 2003) (San Diego); *Cardona*, 2005 WL 3709244 (Seattle). The Ninth Circuit did too. *See Cordes*, 421 F.3d at 893, 898-899.[4]

Try as the government might, it cannot rewrite history. Before 2005, LPRs in Petitioner's situation were eligible for Section 212(c) relief, as government counsel conceded in this very case. Pet. App. 43a. The BIA's later contrary ruling was an unjustified, retroactive, arbitrary and capricious "change in law."

b. As Petitioner demonstrated, the BIA's new position distinguishes between (1) deportable LPRs who traveled abroad, were readmitted, and subsequently were placed in deportation proceedings, and (2) LPRs deportable on the same charge who never departed. Pet. 25. The government admits as much when it indicates that Petitioner would have been eligible for relief had he left the country (Opp. 18), yet it points to no rational basis for treating deportable LPRs who did *not* travel abroad less favorably than deportable LPRs who did. Pet. 27; *Francis* v. *INS*, 532 F.2d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 1976); *Matter of L-*, 1 I. & N. Dec. 1, 6 (Att'y Gen. 1940) ("To require [Petitioner] to go to Canada and re-

[4] *Komarenko* was an unremarkable application of the statutory counterpart rule to a firearms offense, namely assault with a deadly weapon under Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(2), which is *not* an excludable CIMT. *Carr* v. *INS*, 86 F.3d 949, 951 (9th Cir. 1996). Even if Komarenko had departed, he could not have sought Section 212(c) relief. The opposite is true of Petitioner.

enter will make him no better resident of this country.").[5]

The government's response depends primarily on distorting Petitioner's contentions. The government proceeds as though Petitioner sought to be treated like an LPR who "left the United States and attempted to return" but was placed in removal proceedings "based on a charge of inadmissibility." Opp. 10. Petitioner made no such argument. Rather, the correct comparison is to "an LPR in *deportation proceedings* who had previously traveled abroad" and whose offense of conviction qualifies as a CIMT. Pet. 22 (emphasis added). Such persons are eligible for Section 212(c) relief in deportation under the longstanding *nunc pro tunc* procedure. Pet. 7-9; *see also* Pet. App. 23a (Eleventh Circuit's recognition that an LPR who "is convicted of a deportable offense, travels abroad, returns to the United States, and then is placed in deportation proceedings" is eligible under Section 212(c)).

The government's mischaracterization of Petitioner's argument is perhaps understandable, because the government would rather argue that persons who have "already been admitted to the country" may be treated differently from persons "seeking admission." Opp. 12. But that is not the issue. The challenged distinction is among *deportable* LPRs, all of whom have

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[5] The government contends (Opp. 12) that Congress's "enactment" of an "immigration provision" is constitutional if there is a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" for it. Petitioner does not challenge any congressional "enactment," but an unconstitutional distinction created by a *BIA decision* that is inconsistent with the longstanding application of Section 212(c). Therefore, rational-basis review applies.

"already been admitted to the country." As noted, the government does not even try to articulate any rational basis for distinguishing (especially retroactively) between deportable LPRs based only on whether they previously departed the country.

The government acknowledges Petitioner's actual argument once, in a footnote (Opp. 16 n.6), and even then its response is off-point. Contrary to the government's insinuation, grants of relief *nunc pro tunc* to deportable LPRs readmitted after departure are far from extraordinary; they represent a "long-established administrative practice" reflected in numerous BIA decisions. *Matter of Arias-Uribe*, 13 I. & N. Dec. 696, 698 (BIA 1971), *aff'd*, 466 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 1972); *see also Matter of K-*, 9 I. & N. Dec. 585, 586 (BIA 1962); *Matter of G-A-*, 7 I. & N. Dec. 274, 276 (BIA 1956); *Matter of S-*, 6 I. & N. Dec. 392, 396 (BIA 1954); *Hernandez-Casillas*, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 284 n.6 (refusing to overrule *G-A-* and *S-*). The government cites no case in which a deportable LPR's case was held insufficiently "extraordinary" for Section 212(c) relief *nunc pro tunc*.[6]

The government's suggestion that an equal protection claim fails unless the LPR can identify an inadmissibility subsection containing "similar language" to his deportation subsection (Opp. 3, 15) is baseless. An equal protection challenge to a governmental distinction (prior travel) that appears nowhere in the relevant statute (Section 212(c)) cannot be defeated by pointing

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[6] Nor was the LPR in *L-* "deported and subsequently reentering" (Opp. 16 n.6 (quotation marks omitted)); he voluntarily traveled to Yugoslavia, was readmitted on a reentry permit, and later received relief *nunc pro tunc* in deportation proceedings. 1 I. & N. Dec. at 4-6.

to semantic variations in completely *different* statutory subsections (the inadmissibility provisions of Section 212(a) and the deportability provisions of Section 237). As the Second Circuit reasoned, the government's "emphasis on similar language is strange." *Blake* v. *Carbone*, 489 F.3d 88, 102 (2d Cir. 2007). Congress plainly did not draft Section 212(a) and Section 237 on the theory that discrepancies in their terminology would determine the availability of relief under Section 212(c).

Nor is it an answer that Petitioner is "not being treated any differently from other aliens" denied relief under *Blake* (Opp. 16; *accord* Opp. i), any more than discrimination against red-headed people could be defended by pointing out that all redheads were treated alike. The government "cannot deflect an equal protection challenge by observing that … all those within the burdened class are similarly situated. The classification must reflect pre-existing differences; it cannot create new ones that are supported by only their own bootstraps." *Williams* v. *Vermont*, 472 U.S. 14, 27 (1985); *see also Rinaldi* v. *Yeager*, 384 U.S. 305, 308-309 (1966) (equal protection "imposes a requirement of some rationality in the nature of the class singled out").

The government cites the Ninth Circuit's now-abrogated decision in *Komarenko* as "persuasive." Opp. 13. The relative persuasiveness of the circuits' differing views is the very issue this Court should resolve on certiorari. For now, it suffices to note that Komarenko's offense was not held to be a CIMT and, accordingly, raised a different equal protection issue, as the government recognizes. *Id.* (*Komarenko* considered whether "two groups of aliens *convicted of different crimes*" were similarly situated (emphasis added)). That analysis is irrelevant to this case, which involves the BIA's decision to treat deportable LPRs convicted

of the *same crime* and deportable under the *same charge* differently depending on whether the LPR previously left the country.

The Second Circuit addressed that very question and answered it correctly. It did not require consideration of "the facts" of particular cases (Opp. 19); the BIA need only determine whether an LPR's statutory offense is a CIMT as well as an aggravated felony. *Blake* v. *Carbone*, 489 F.3d at 105. Nor did the Second Circuit "vastly overstep" the judicial role. Opp. 14 (quotation marks omitted). Federal courts, including this Court, routinely review agency determinations that an offense is a CIMT. *E.g.*, *Jordan* v. *De George*, 341 U.S. 223, 223-224, 232 (1951) ("conspiracy to defraud the United States of taxes on distilled spirits" is a CIMT). Often, as here, the issue is not even disputed.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

SETH P. WAXMAN
PAUL R.Q. WOLFSON
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE AND DORR LLP
1875 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 663-6000

MARIA I. CASABLANCA
CASABLANCA LEGAL GROUP
444 Brickell Ave., Suite 416
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MARK C. FLEMING
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HALE AND DORR LLP
60 State Street
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(617) 526-6000
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